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THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO FEMALE LEADERSHIP AT THE EXECUTIVE
LEVEL AND IN TRADITIONALLY MASCULINE FIELDS: HOW WE CAN
ERASE IMPLICIT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH THE LAW
Grace S. Hong
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, studies have shown that organizations in which women are more
strongly represented at board or top-management levels have seen more economic
success.1 However, performance models and expectations remain male oriented, creating
barriers to women’s entry into these influential positions.2 The schism between these
expectations and women’s gender3 and sex create a number of problems generally foreign
to their male counterparts, including the double burden syndrome (having to juggle both
home and work life, though men are increasingly reporting that they too feel this burden),
difficulty finding a mentor, and difficulty identifying with success or even taking
responsibility for success.4 These problems are reflected statistically: women in high and
mid-level management positions are more likely to feel discriminated against (27% of
women compared to 7% of men), to be single (33% compared to 18% of men), and
childless (54% of women compared to 29% of men).5
Existing laws have proven unhelpful in changing the male-oriented models in the
workplace, and in many cases have supported their continued existence.

6

Antidiscrimination laws have mainly focused on differences in biology, treating these as
more legitimate than differences based on gender or the cultural manifestations of

DESVAUX, ET AL., WOMEN MATTER 1 (2007).
Id. at 7.
3See infra Part II.A (referring to the cultural manifestations of biological sex).
4 See DESVAUX, supra note 1 at 7.
5 Id.
6 See infra Parts II, III, IV.
1GEORGES
2
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characteristics of the male and female label. 7

In this way, laws have failed to

acknowledge that most sex discrimination cases are in fact responses to gender
performance

8

or an individual’s specific manner of self-presentation.
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This

“disaggregation of sex and gender” results in a legal system that perpetuates inequality in
the workplace by holding people to different standards of appropriate gender
performance based on whether they present themselves as male or female.10
This problem becomes even more insidious—and harder to see—at the leadership
level. Leadership, like many of the most elite occupations, has been historically
characterized by masculinity, making such roles more difficult to attain for women who
do not fit the masculine portrait.11 While women’s continued advancements in education
will undoubtedly increase their presence in formal leadership roles and leadership roles
that are easily influenced by popular culture, the law should intercede to the extent that it
is informed by historical notions, and to the extent that it fails to address the issue of
female leadership at the highest levels and in certain male-dominant fields, including, for
example, the world of finance or the legal profession.
This paper will proceed in the following manner. Part II will focus on defining
gender generally and will present a brief legislative and political history of discrimination
based on sex, showing how courts have been inconsistent in their interpretations of
gender/sex in a way that has perpetuated sexual inequality. It will also specifically
See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination law: The Disaggregation of Sex
From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1996)(discussing the focus on biological sex by courts based
on the belief that Congress had left no legislative history and biological recognition as the goal of Title
VII).
8 See infra Parts II, III, and IV.
9 See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(1990)(arguing that gender is a manifestation of concepts garnered from society rather than the
expression of a prior reality).
10 Franke, supra note 7, at 11.
11 See infra Part IV.
7
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highlight the way definitions of both sex and gender are used in transgender cases in
order to emphasize the incredible impact inconsistent use of these terms has when applied
to people who do not neatly fit into generalized expectations of what it means to be a man
or a woman. While transgender rights are not the focus of this paper, it is important to
note that they are automatically implicated by a conversation about defining gender and
sex in a uniform manner simply because of the categorically dualistic nature of sex and
gender. Part III will show how the workplace often requires women to maintain very
specific gender identities, and how these expectations negatively impact women,
particularly in historically male-dominant fields. Part IV will examine how masculine
expectations in leadership roles are keeping women out of these roles and present a
unique danger to the development of equality in the workplace. Part V will conclude by
focusing on women’s positive influence in organizational excellence and why these
changes are crucial in today’s society.
II.

DEFINING GENDER AND REVEALING INCONSISTENCIES

A. A Brief Political and Legislative History
The term gender has not always meant what we think it means today. John
William Money, a pioneer in the field of sexology, can be credited for permanently
broadening our understanding of this term.12 Prior to his work in the 1950’s, gender was
only associated with grammar 13 and it wasn’t until 1972 that Money was able to
popularize the notion that sex and gender were two distinct concepts. 14 Today, the
layperson is more than familiar with the term “gender.” In the day-to-day, many use the
J. Richard Udry, The Nature of Gender, 31 DEMOGRAPHY NO. 4 561, 561 (1994)(explaining the biosocial origin of gender in females).
13 See Id. (referring to a subclass of nouns in languages that contain a system of noun classification).
14 ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 3
(2000)(describing the political, scientific, and sociological history of gender and sexuality).
12
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term synonymously with biological sex, though the term as Money popularized it refers
to the cultural manifestation of biological sex. 15 Nonetheless, the expansion of the
definition of gender has proven to be both a blessing and a curse in the context of
contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence. As Katherine M. Franke points out in her
1995 article The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex
from Gender, our sex discrimination jurisprudence grounds itself in the notion that sex
and gender are two distinct aspects of human identity and further still, that “sex,
conceived as biological difference, is prior to, less normative than, and more real, than
gender.”

16

This has led to inconsistent and confusing results in cases of sex

discrimination, and has rendered the law less than effective as a means of breaking the
barriers to women’s rightful place in the workforce and in leadership roles.17 Thus, while
the designation of “gender” as something separate from biological sex has helped to
generally spread the understanding of a social aspect of sex, its later introduction has
lessened its importance in the scheme of the law.
A quick glance at our sex discrimination jurisprudence more than justifies
Franke’s claim. The treatment of sex and gender in the case law is circumstantial and
inconsistent.18 However, the confusion and disparate treatment of the terms have a clear
source. While the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 is extensive in its
determinations concerning race and ethnicity, the term “sex” was included belatedly on

JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: DIFFERENTIATION AND DIMORPHISM
(1973)(arguing that gender and sexuality differentiation be based in individual biography and
achievement rather than biological differentiation alone).
16Franke, supra note 7, at 1.
17 See infra Parts II, III, and IV.
18 See Id. Courts vary between explaining discrimination as a product of differentiating based on
biology and discrimination as a product of gross stereotyping.
15
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the floor of the House of Representatives just before the legislation was passed.19 This
has led many courts to conclude that they were on their own to define the word in line
with the “plain meaning” rule of statutory construction.20 However, the belief that the
courts had no guidance in defining the term “sex” meant they would ignore the political
and legislative history outlining the fight for equal rights for women that began long
before the Act was passed—a history that is crucial to understanding what “sex” really
means. This history is critical because after their failure to get an equal rights amendment
solely for the rights of women passed, early feminist ultimately used their lobbying
powers to have “sex” included in Title VII instead.21
The first equal rights amendment (ERA) was introduced in 1923 by the National
Women’s Party (NWP), but was immediately met with opposition from the Women’s
Bureau in the Department of Labor, as well as from several other women’s
organizations.22 Opposition was based in the concern that the ERA as introduced would
abolish protective labor laws that many women felt were still necessary. 23 But the
beginning of World War II and a shortage of domestic workers meant that women were
occupying a greater portion of the wage-labor market than ever before.24 These changes
brought to light a need for both “recognition and compensation” for the war-time work
See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971)(describing how the prohibition against sex discrimination was
added without any prior hearings or debate in the House).
20 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1986)(finding that Title VII was added at the
last minute and that Courts have little legislative history for guidance); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742
F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)(finding that sex was added as the “gambit of a congressman seeking
to scuttle adoption of the Civil Rights Act”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 n.4
(9th Cir. 1977)(stating that there is a “dearth of legislative history” regarding the addition of sex in
Title VII).
21 See generally, Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism As a Maker of Public
Policy, 9 Law & Ineq. J. 163 (1991)(explaining how the inclusion of “sex” was ultimately the
byproduct of the women’s movement for equal rights).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 165-70.
24 Id.
19
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that women were doing, and thus the National Women’s Party gained strength and
support.25 An Equal Rights Amendment including women’s rights was lobbied for more
aggressively by the NWP.
From the 1940’s through the beginning of the 1960’s, Senator Pauli Murray
suggested to both sides of the ERA struggle that the question of equality be taken to the
courts.26 It was Murray’s understanding that receiving a Supreme Court ruling under the
Equal Protection Clause could clarify the basic rights for women and do away with laws
that arbitrarily impeded women’s presence in the public sphere. 27 This compromise
ultimately led to the litigation of the most seminal Supreme Court cases relating to equal
protection for women: Reed v. Reed, 28 Frontiero v. Richardson, 29 Schlesinger v.
Ballard,30 and Craig v. Boren.31 These cases created a constitutional right to equality for
women while also delineating the differences between the sexes and sex discrimination
from the differences seen in race and racial discrimination. 32 These cases therefore
represent a significant part of the history of sex-based discrimination and in fact reveal to
the careful historian that the protection accorded by the Supreme Court to women in the
name of biological sex were in fact in response to discrimination based on gender roles.33

Freeman, supra note 21, at 170.
Id.
27 Franke, supra note 7, at 22.
28 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
30 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
31 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
32 Franke, supra note 7, at 23.
33 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(holding that Idaho statute preferring male estate
administrators based on the history of their better qualification violated the equal protection clause
of the Constitution); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(holding that statute putting extra
requirements on female members of armed forces to prove financial status before receiving certain
benefits violated the Equal Protection Clause); Schlesinger v. Ballad, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)(holding that
distinction between male and female officers standards of discharge for men and attrition for women
were legitimately based on differences in service roles); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)(holding
25
26
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This is illustrated by the fact that the cases revolve around problems with sexbased protective wage and hour rules, divorce, childrearing, and familial support
obligations, all of which are representations of cultural norms adopted by men and
women. While it could be argued that these norms arise from a biological difference, to
the extent that they are social manifestations of biological differences, it is clear that the
Supreme Court understood that sex-based discrimination was an impermissible
acknowledgement of the social manifestations of biological difference. Thus, it would be
disingenuous to suggest that the courts were without guidance in defining “sex” in the
context of Title VII, when these cases were a meaningful step in the fight to include sex
in Title VII at all. After all, it was only through continuous lobbying efforts over the
course of an extend time period before Title VII to pass an equal rights amendment that
allowed “sex” to be included at the eleventh hour with success.34
Therefore, a closer look at the fight for equality makes plain that the courts were
not in fact, without guidance in the determining what Congress meant by “sex” in Title
VII. The inclusion of sex was not haphazard and unplanned, but the result of a long battle
for recognition largely powered by the NWP. However, the history does point out that
certain implications of its inclusion had not been considered, namely questions regarding
transgendered people and transsexualism. But to the extent that gender is a modern notion
that only recently found its place in discourse and human understanding, it becomes clear
that prior to the distinction between sex and gender, sex had been interpreted to include
what gender connotes today, and therefore remains a loaded term that courts could mold

that statistical evidence based on driving differences between men and women do not support
drinking age discrimination between males and females).
34 LEILA J. RUPP & VERTA TAYLOR, SURVIVAL IN THE DOLDRUMS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1945 TO THE 1960S 191 (1987)(recounting the history of the women’s movement).
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to fit their needs. That some courts continue to refuse to acknowledge something beyond
a biological definition of sex, reasoning that they have no guidance to believe otherwise,
implies that the law probably would not be able to reach many individuals who have been
discriminated against based on their sex or gender in the context of promotions and
leadership positions.
B. Sex Discrimination Based on Stereotyping
In looking at the disparate treatment of the idea of gender and sex in case law, I
will utilize a sample of cases in which various courts explain their own definitions in
ways that are at odds with definition used by other courts. As will be garnered from this
sampling, courts generally take one of two approaches: (1) they define gender/sex as
either solely referring to biological or anatomical characteristics, leading to a finding of
discrimination only in the context of biological distinction; or (2) they define sex/gender
as an immutable characteristic and discrimination as a byproduct of improper
stereotyping. These variations suggest that definitions of gender and sex are in fact
circumstantial to the litigation at hand, with people at the fringes of their gender suffering
the most.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 35 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
definition of sex includes cultural and social notions, or gender in its primary definition.
The Supreme Court is explicit: “In forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” 36 In Price
Waterhouse, a female senior manager was denied a promotion because she was

35
36

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 248.
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considered too masculine. Her superiors suggested that she take “a course at charm
school” and that, were she more feminine, she would have a better chance of attaining the
promotion. 37 The Supreme Court held that “in the context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” 38 Here, it is clear that the Court had
moved beyond a simple biological distinction and acknowledges that the term “sex” as
Congress intended, did in fact include the social and cultural manifestations of sex.
Even prior to Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court had already implicitly
affirmed the notion that “sex” incorporated both biological and cultural understandings of
sex/gender in both Frontiero v. Richardson39 and Schlesinger v. Ballard.40 In Frontiero,
the Court went into a lengthy consideration concerning the improper use of “common
knowledge” ideas of women’s inferior status that Reed v. Reed41 resulted in the Idaho
Legislature’s decision that “in general men are better qualified to act as administrator
than are women.”42 The court states in Frontiero, “[a]s a result of notions such as these,
our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the
sexes, and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our
society was, in many respects comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave
codes….” 43 The court further explains that a “sex characteristic frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.” 44 Similarly, in Schlesinger, the
court explained again that “archaic and overbroad generalizations” could not be tolerated
Id. at 235.
Id. at 250.
39 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
40 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
41 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
42 411 U.S. at 683.
43 Id. at. 685.
44 Id. at 686.
37
38
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under the Constitution.45 There, a male naval officer claimed discrimination based on a
statute that subjected only male naval officers to automatic discharge when they weren’t
promoted consecutively was unconstitutional discrimination based on sex.
This line of cases is significant because they affirm what other courts attempt to
deny—that “sex” as included in Title VII does not merely refer to someone’s anatomical
or biological characteristics, but also to the social implications of associating with the
male or female label. 46 When courts do acknowledge that “sex” in Title VII includes
something more than biological traits, they are coming much closer to the reality of
gender and sex as we experience them in every day settings. The term “female” does not
necessarily have to connote femininity and being “male” does not necessarily implicate
masculinity. Therefore, to the extent that leadership has been historically characterized by
masculinity,47 courts must define sex and gender expansively in the context of Title VII
discrimination cases in order to assure that they are not penalizing claimants for failing to
conform with idealized notions of masculine and feminine behavior.
C. Courts Define ‘Sex’ in Title VII as Referring to Biological or Anatomical
Characteristics
On the whole, it seems that courts prefer to define gender and sex in terms of
biological and anatomical differences when the issue presented is one of discrimination
based on transgender or gender identity confusion. When courts rely on biology, they
generally find discrimination only when a person is treated differently because of their

45

419 U.S. at 508.
See infra Parts II.C, III.B.
47 See infra Part IV.B.
46
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anatomical characteristics.48 As a preliminary issue, courts explain that they must take on
the “plain meaning” approach and start off their inquiry by suggesting that Congress
could not have meant to protect transsexuals under Title VII.49 And as can be seen from
the political and legislative history accounted above, it is in fact true that the addition of
“sex” did not necessarily consider the plight of transsexuals. Nonetheless, the way that
the Supreme Court has ultimately construed “sex” in the context of equal rights and the
14th Amendment does suggest that courts must respond to cultural understanding of
proper social roles.50 To that end, when courts take on this “plain meaning” approach of
statutory construction, they should be considering whether the person that is being
discriminated against is being treated differently for failing to conform to their expected
gender roles like the Supreme Court did in Reed, Fronteiro, and other equal protection
cases. However, as will be shown, Courts refrain from this broadened interpretation of
sex and gender when considering marginalized groups, or people who do not fit into the
neat little categorizations of what has historically been understood as “male” and
“female”. The implication would be that even members of the population who do not
suffer from gender dysphoria or recognize themselves as transgender may be denied
protection under Title VII if they fail to conform to expectations of how they ought to
behave as representatives of their sex.
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 51 a transsexual pilot brought suit, alleging
discrimination after she was fired from her job as a pilot for the airline. The Seventh

See generally Ulane v. E. Airlines 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985);
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 850
F.Supp. 284 (1993).
49 Id.
50 See supra Part II.A.
51 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
48
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Circuit addressed the lack of a legislative history explaining the term “sex” and the lack
of any intent to protect transsexuals as a class of people under Title VII. 52 The court then
explaind that why the discrimination that Ulane experienced did not amount to sex
discrimination:
If Eastern had considered Ulane to be female and had discriminated
against her because she was female (i.e. Eastern treated females less
favorably than males), then the argument might be made that Title VII
applied, but this is not the case. It is clear from the evidence that if Eastern
did discriminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female, but
because Ulane is a transsexual—a biological male who takes female
hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to
make it appear female.53
The court here very clearly draws a distinction between sex discrimination as dependent
on the original biological status of the person and demands that femininity belong to
biological females and masculinity to biological males.
Similarly, in Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak),54 a transsexual
employee alleged discrimination based on her transsexualism. Here, the court
immediately attempts to distinguish sex from gender and states that the term “sex” as
used in Title VII is not synonymous with the term “gender,” and that Congress’s use of
“sex” was simply in reference to “an individual’s distinguishing biological or anatomical
characteristics,” whereas gender would have encompassed discrimination based on sexual
identity.55 The court then clarifies that a transsexual person would have a claim for sex
discrimination if the person were discriminated against because of his or her sex, that is,
if Amtrak had actually considered Dobre to be female and discriminated against her “on

Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1087.
54 850 F.Supp. 284 (1993).
55 Id. at 286.
52
53
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that basis.”56 But from there the analysis takes a different turn, and the court backtracks
from their “biology only” distinction to state that discrimination based on stereotypic
conceptions about a woman’s ability to perform a job or discrimination based on
conditions common to women alone could constitute discrimination. 57 The court then
determines that Dobre was discriminated against because she was perceived as a male
who wanted to become female,58 without realizing that based on their logic, Dobre had a
legitimate claim for discrimination as a man: Dobre was penalized for not falling in line
with stereotypic conceptions about men’s abilities and conditions common to man.
More recently, in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, a male diagnosed with gender
identity disorder (GID) was fired because of concerns as to which bathroom he would be
using while on the job (employees used public restrooms.)59 The Tenth Circuit, again
recounting the lack of legislative history and any congressional intent to protect
transsexuals under Title VII, concluded like many other courts, that “sex” was in
reference to the binary conception of sex and could not include transsexuals.60
Prior to the Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of the Utah District Court’s decision, the
Utah Court went to great lengths to distinguish itself from the Sixth Circuit,61 where two
cases involving transsexuals were treated as having legitimate claims under Title VII by
extension of the rationale used in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.62 The court explains that
there is a “huge difference” between an unfeminine woman and a man who is attempting
to become a woman, and announces that such drastic changes should not be characterized
Id. at 287.
Id.
58 Id.
59 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
60 Id. at 1221.
61 No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah Civ. R. 7-2 June 24, 2005).
62 Id. at 4.
56
57
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as “failure to conform to stereotypes.” 63 It further cited the DSM-IV, the American
Psychiatric Association’s Manual for Mental Disorders, to support its conclusion that
GID goes beyond nonconformity to touch upon stereotypes.64 The court then noted that
even after Price Waterhouse, the narrower Ulane approach to “sex” in Title VII continues
to be followed. The court went on to explain that allowing this “failure to conform to
stereotypes” as legitimate reasoning in the finding of discrimination is essentially a
“slippery slope”:
In fact, if something as drastic as a man's attempt to dress and appear as a
woman is simply a failure to conform to the male stereotype, and nothing
more, then there is no social custom or practice associated with a
particular sex that is not a stereotype. And if that is the case, then any male
employee could dress as a woman, appear and act as a woman, and use the
women's restrooms, showers and locker rooms, and any attempt by the
employer to prohibit such behavior would constitute sex stereotyping in
violation of Title VII.65
This type of thinking about gender and sex highlights courts’ reluctance to
broaden sex-related discrimination statutes beyond biology. The findings in cases like
Dobre and Ulane take on a view that Professor Katherine Franke stated most eloquently,
in which “one’s inside—is immutable—whereas gender identity—one’s outside—is
mutable. Yet for the transgendered person, the sexed body—one’s outside—is regarded
as mutable while one’s gender identity—one’s inside—is experienced as immutable.”66
And so it seems that there are genuinely two distinct ways to understand sex
discrimination as defined by our courts. One approach equates simple differentiation
between the sexes as discrimination, while the other equates the generalization of

Id. at 5.
Id.
65 Id.
66 Franke, supra note 7, at 35.
63
64
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differences as discrimination. 67 But no matter which approach a court takes in its
explanation of sex discrimination, the law assumes a natural and biological foundation to
sexual difference, ignoring the reality that gender norms, not biological facts, are at the
core of the differences we recognize in the two sexes. As Franke points out in her article,
when women are denied employment, very rarely is it because the discriminator
genuinely believes that the Y chromosome is necessary for the job.68 To that end then,
Franke is correct in stating that biology and genitals are simply “false proxies for the real
rules of both gender attribution and sexual identity in our culture.”69 In the context of
leadership, I argue that it is these types of people – people who do not generally meet
societal expectations of their gender/sex, that are most likely to be overlooked for
promotions and leadership positions. Moreover, to the extent that they attempt to look to
the courts for a remedy, they will be unlikely to succeed so long as courts continue to use
varying definitions of sex and gender.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY WORK FOR WOMEN

When considering leadership and the workplace, the normative views on gender
and biological sex become extremely problematic, as leadership itself has historically
been characterized by masculinity. 70 The dualistic thinking about gender/sex is a
legitimate concern because it makes it harder to see the interrelated-ness of male and
female, masculinity and femininity. So as long the legal system continues to equate
femininity with females and masculinity with males, sex discrimination at the leadership
level will be difficult to prove, since men, by virtue of being male, would seemingly be a
See generally supra Part II.B.
Franke, supra note 7, at 12 n.143(explaining cases and studies by which actual biology is a
factor, namely pregnancy).
69 Id. at 38.
70 See infra Part V.
67

68See
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better fit for those roles. Furthermore, the courts are unable to take into account the
amount of mental maintenance work women are ultimately required to do in the
workplace in order to overcome masculine workplace expectations. This suggests that
courts do not take into account the negative impact this type of maintenance and identity
work71 has on women. As a result, these women are less likely to receive promotions and
offers to important leadership positions—positions which are essential to influencing
large groups of people and changing the way we view women’s proper role in society.
A. Understanding the Effects of Identity Work on Women
Identity work is the concept that people have to negotiate between their sense of
self and external pressure to behave a certain way. 72 It is called “work” because it
requires and consumes resources from the person in the form of time and effort. 73 For
example, in order to conform to a particular work environment, a woman might invest in
an entirely new wardrobe. This would cost both time and money, and therefore is a type
of “work.” While it is true that everyone must perform identity work in order to navigate
their social setting, “outsider groups,” like women and minorities, perceive themselves as
being subject to stereotypes that must be overcome.74 This expands the amount of work
that they must do. To that end, a woman generally has to commit to a greater amount of
work in order to maintain her identity in male-dominant fields and signal to the dominant
group that she in fact is a member the group.

See infra Part III.A (defining identity work as the idea that we must negotiate between a sense of
self and external pressures to behave a certain way. Called work because it consumes resources in
the form of energy and time).
72 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, n.2
(2000)(explaining basic identity concepts and stating that everyone does identity work).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1262; see also CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM
CREATE DIFFERENCE (2010)(discussing the actual similarities and differences we see in men and
women and the significant effects of stereotyping on women).
71
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Dr. Cordelia Fine explains this phenomenon as “stereotype threat” or “the realtime threat of being judged and treated poorly in settings where a negative stereotype
about one’s group applies.” 75 The significance of stereotype threat is best illustrated
through sociological studies, whereby simply lowering the threat changes the
performance ability of individuals.76 For example, when a calculus test was presented to a
group of men and women in the standard manner by which most tests are administered,
women did not perform as well as their male counterparts. However, when that same test
was administered and the exam takers were told beforehand that the exam had proven to
be equally hard for men and women, women actually performed better on the same test.77
These types of studies show that by simply changing the perceived level of threat, we can
enhance or reduce the ability of a given group of people. Dr. Fine further explains that
triggering the realization that a negative stereotype about one’s group is in effect can
occur in “disquietingly natural” ways:
Stereotype threat effects have been seen in women who: record their sex at
the beginning of a quantitative test; are in a minority as they take the test;
have just watched women acting in air-headed ways in commercials, or
have instructors or peers who hold—consciously or otherwise—sexist
attitudes. Worse still, subtle triggers for stereotype threat seem to be more
harmful than blatant cues, which suggests the intriguing possibility that
stereotype threat may be more of an issue for women now than it was
decades ago, when people were more loose-lipped when it came to
denigrating female ability.78
In the same vein, Dr. Fine points out recent studies revealing that recognition of a
stereotype’s applicability to one’s social group in the course of one’s work makes that
individual perform worse because it takes extra mental resources to suppress those

75See

FINE, supra note 74, at 30.
Id.
77 Id. at 31.
78 Id.
76
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negative ideas and anxieties about themselves.79 This is an important consideration in the
promotion context because it is likely that the more a woman feels that she might be
stereotyped as a bad leader or unfit for the job by virtue of her womanhood, the more
likely it is that she will actually be a bad leader. This can be a rather serious problem
because in order to perform well in leadership capacities, she needs to remain focused
and confident, yet while working under the threat of stereotype, it is more likely that she
will be distracted by “self-doubts and anxieties” that impede her abilities.80
Another significant consequence of stereotype threat is that it creates a “failureprevention mindset”:
“The mind turns from a focus on seeking success (being bold and creative)
to a focus on avoiding failure, which involves being cautious, careful, and
conservative (referred to as promotion focus and prevention focus,
respectively). With horrible irony, the harder women try to succeed in
quantitative domains, the greater the mental obstacles become for several
reasons.... Also, the more difficult and nonroutine the work, the more
vulnerable its performance will be to the sapping of working memory, and
possibly the switch to a more cautious problem-solving strategy.”81
Again, stereotype threat and the extra burden in negotiating it is by no means a “women’s
problem.” Stereotype threat will work against any person who stands at odds with
whatever the norms are in his/her specific social environment. But because leadership
positions are those that yield a high degree of influence and power, overcoming the
damaging effects of stereotype threat to women and minorities who are attempting to
gain these positions (positions which have been historically denied to them) cannot be a
simple feat. Complicated studies that have looked into the effects of ambition and drive
in relation to higher testosterone levels suggest that the negative stereotype of women’s
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lesser ability when compared to men’s is even more harmful to the type of woman who is
already struggling to rise in the ranks of her field. 82 A woman exposed to negative
stereotypes about her group’s ability can suffer from a “cognition-impairing mismatch”
between her desire for high status and the low status that the stereotype ascribes to her.83
In these areas, the implicit stereotyping of gender and the existing gender gap mutually
reinforce and feed into one another.84
In sum, the identity work and negotiating that women must do in attempts to gain
leadership positions or even just to fit into the culture of their workplace present a
genuine obstacle mostly overlooked by anti-discrimination laws in their current form.
Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, professors of law at UCLA and Duke University
respectively, suggest that there are three distinct barriers that women face as a direct
result of the identity work they have to do, barriers that current anti-discrimination law
does not consider in their findings of discrimination.85 First, because anti-discrimination
laws aim to compensate the victims of discrimination for the costs and burdens the
discrimination caused in their lives, the failure of these laws to take into account the way
masculine norms burden non-masculine women (and non-masculine men!) in the
workplace means that they do not take into consideration the extra costs of trying to
“blend in” to the culture of her work environment.86 In other words, the more a woman
tries to negotiate her identity to make “insiders,” or the dominant group, comfortable, the
more difficult it would be for her to prove that she had been subject to discrimination.
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Carbado and Gulati call this the “capture problem” since there is a failure in the law to
capture or grasp the full costs of discrimination for these women.87 Similarly, Carbado
and Gulati point out an “evidentiary problem”: so long as a woman successfully engages
in negotiating her identity to fit the workplace, she is undermining her ability to bring a
claim for discrimination thereafter.

88

Finally, antidiscrimination law adopts the

presumption that if the employer can show that it has hired or promoted several outsiders
who belong to the same social minority as the particular employee, it can serve as proof
that the failure to promote in the individual case was not motivated by discriminatory
reasons.89 Carbado and Gulati call this the “doctrinal problem,” explaining that it ignores
the reality that employers are responding to not only the identity status of the woman, but
also to her conduct, and whether she is a positive or negative reflection of other women.90
To that end, acceptance into a certain community requires more than just fitting into
general stereotypes, but fitting into the specific stereotypes shared by the members of that
community about what it means to be a man and woman.
Thus, a court’s definition of “sex” may not be the only factor in determining
whether or not a female claimant can succeed in a discrimination case in the context of
promotions and access to leadership positions. So long as laws fail to consider the full
spectrum of behavior that is required of a woman in order to prove herself worthy of
traditionally masculine positions, courts are unlikely to find that she had been the victim
of discrimination, or even that she objectively qualified for a leadership position, based
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on the belief that a “female identity” is at odds with the masculine characteristics of
leadership.
B. Identity Work in Discrimination Cases
This is not to say that the courts have never considered identity work in
discrimination cases. Courts have in fact considered various aspects of gender
performance, but whenever it is considered, it is sharply limited or curtailed. These cases
considering performance are called the “sex plus” cases in that they find discrimination
when based on a policy that is directed at sex “plus” some other characteristic. 91 For
instance, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,92 a woman was denied employment by
virtue of her status as a woman and mother to a young child. The Supreme Court
recognized that just because the employer had employed other women did not mean they
were allowed to discriminate against a sub-category of women, in this case, women with
young children.93 The court ruled that Phillips could not be treated differently based on
this one aspect of her identity.94 Clearly, Phillips’ employer believed, and not without
reason, that her identity as a young mother would impede her ability to meet the
expectations of her job, as though the mere fact that she had a young child guaranteed
that she would be unfit to meet the needs of her occupation. The Supreme Court tells us,
in so many words, that this type of assumption is not appropriate in the context of
employment. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recognized in Allen v. Lovejoy95 that suspending
a female employee for refusing to adopt her husband’s last name in the work place was
See Mary Ellen Maatman, Listening to Deaf Culture: A Reconceptualization of Difference Analysis
Under Title VII, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. &EMP. L.J. 269, 276-77 (1996)(explaining the history of “sex-plus”
cases in the courts in cases were men or women were discriminated by employer’s work policies).
92 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
93Id. at 544.
94 Id.
95 553 F.2d 522 (1977).
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sex discrimination. 96 Again, the court seems to be aware that the employer was
penalizing the plaintiff for defying their expectation as to proper behavior for female
employees. This, they determined, constituted discrimination.97
Nevertheless, the court’s willingness to recognize the inappropriateness of
discrimination based on gender/identity performance in this arena ends there, as courts
have been opposed to extending the doctrine to cover performances of identity in the
every-day context. Courts have consistently rejected challenges to employers’ dress-andappearance requirements, insisting that such requirements are “trivial” matters reflecting
“personal preference” that are completely under the employee’s control.98 Some courts
have even gone as far as to limit the sex-plus doctrine explicitly to cases that involve
biological characteristics, the exercise of a constitutional right, or serious deprivation of
opportunities.99
Courts have also overlooked the difficulty of identity work by requiring that
gender performance be in accordance with the will of majority or dominant group, or
whoever is responsible for dictating the social environment. 100 By doing so, the courts in
essence affirm the notion of a “right” way to be woman and a “right” way to be man.
This idea is best illustrated in sex discrimination cases wherein plaintiffs are denied their
claims. 101 The courts in their decisions are solidifying the notion that both they and
employers have the authority to decide which generalized notions of male and female are
Id. at 524.
Id.
98 Carbado, supra note 72, at 1299, n.106.
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acceptable or unacceptable. In a group of cases aptly named the “haircut” cases, many
courts determined that sex discrimination could not be found based on employer
standards regarding hair length for men.102 The courts take the stance that hair length is a
matter of choice, not an immutable characteristic, and therefore employers have a right to
exercise their discretion in this area. 103 The Fifth Circuit in Willingham v. Macon
explains: “Distinctions in employment practices between men and women on the basis of
something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not inhibit employment
opportunity in violation of Title VII.”104
In line with the belief that the courts and employers can determine proper gender
performance, in Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, the court found there was no violation
of Title VII when a female secretary was fired for wearing pantsuits. 105 The court
determined that wearing pantsuits was something that the plaintiff did because she
wanted to and that the policy did not perpetuate a stereotype about her gender but merely
reflected the plaintiff’s personal beliefs. 106 The Supreme Court has also affirmed this
belief in addressing gender performance in Meritor Savings Bank. 107 While the Court
there did ultimately hold in favor of the discriminated employee, the court also made
clear that a plaintiff’s performance could be relevant in a sexual harassment claim to
address the question of whether the harassing conduct was “welcomed” by the plaintiff:
“While voluntariness in the sense of consent is not a defense to a sexual harassment
claim, it does not follow that a complainant’s sexually provocative speech or dress is
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irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particularly sexual
advances welcome.”108
Based on the rationales noted in the above cases, it seems that courts are
unwilling to acknowledge that conforming to workplace expectations may require a
significant amount of identity work. Men and women may be required to engage in
behavior that is not in line with either their own identities, or on the other hand, engage in
behavior that is not in line with general social expectations of how females and males
ought not to behave as representatives of their social group. While the court found that
the plaintiff in Lanigan could be penalized for wearing pants in blatant disregard of the
employer’s preference for more stereotypically feminine women,109 in Meritor the court
acknowledges that a woman with a tendency to be sexually provocative in speech or
dress may be denied her claim to sexual harassment, in that it may be probative of
whether she welcomed sexual advances, although both types of actions could easily be
seen as a type of identity work a woman had to do in order to preserve her job or preserve
her sense of dignity. Nevertheless, the courts are willing to place the burden of
conformity entirely on the claimants of discrimination both for the failure to conform and
for conforming “too well.” If either type of woman (a woman who conforms and a
woman who does not) were to make a claim for discrimination in the workplace, both
could easily fail to meet the legal standard of discrimination, whether by virtue of a
finding that discrimination can only be based on biological sex, or by virtue of a failure to
prove that she was in fact discriminated against because she blended herself by partaking
in the workplace culture.
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that skirts/dresses are more closely aligned with femininity and females.
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In the same vein, courts have also found that women who are masculine are
inviting harassment or that women who try to accommodate their work environment by
engaging with their harassers have in fact welcomed it. 110 One particularly grotesque
example of this understanding is encapsulated in Reed v. Shephard, where the court
determined that that the plaintiff had lost her claim by using offensive language, engaging
in “exhibitionistic” behavior, giving “suggestive gifts” and otherwise engaging in
sexualized conduct with her harassers.111 What the court failed to take into consideration
was the instigating actions of the plaintiff’s harassers and how Reed was attempting to
negotiate her identity in order for her harassers to accept her into an existing work
community that was already sexually charged.112 Reed stated explicitly that she did not
complain about the harassment because she wanted to be accepted by her peers: “It was
important to me to be a police officer and if that was the only way that I could be
accepted, I would just put up with it and kept [sic] my mouth shut.”113
Similarly in Weinsheimer v. Rockwell, the plaintiff was a female employee
working in the largely male-dominant field of engineering. 114 The Court denied
Weinsheimer’s claim of sexual harassment, explaining that much of her problem with the
behavior of her harassers had to do with the fact she, for whatever reason, “perceived”
herself as not being held to the same standard as her male counterparts, implying it was a
problem within herself. 115 Further, the court stated that while in fact the harassing
behavior that Weinsheimer was complaining about did occur, Weinsheimer was one of
See Carbado, supra note 72, at 1295, n.98 (explaining that courts often find evidence of joking with
harassers as relevant in discrimination claims).
111 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
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the chief participants in the creation of the sexually charged atmosphere with her
“confrontational and abusive” personality as evidenced by the way Weinsheimer
interacted with her boyfriend and by the way she responded to sexual speech with equally
sexual speech.116
It is difficult to reconcile such cases that so obviously enforce a standard of
“commonly accepted social norms” and reification of “female = femininity, male =
masculinity” with a legislative mandate that courts also say was intended “to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women” resulting from stereotypes.117
The fact that the approach a court may take has differed over time and place further
shows the difficulty courts have had in separating a person from socially contrived
understandings of “appropriate” behavior based on their gender, and the actual
relationship the division of appropriateness has to biological sex and discrimination.
Thus, when considering identity work in the context of sex-based discrimination, one can
wonder whether women have actually been further disadvantaged by a legal system that
is supposed to help them overcome the difficulties of a male-dominant workplace.
While ignorance to identity work and stereotype threat is clearly a general danger
present at every level of social interaction, perhaps having seen the insidious nature of
discrimination makes it easier to understand why even after all these years, women have
yet to climb the ranks of leadership with the ease of their male counterparts. Male
dominance in the workforce and in particular areas of work is a historical relic and to the
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extent that that law holds onto those notions of gender propriety, women will continue to
struggle to find their place at the top.
IV.

LEADERSHIP: CHANGING DEFINITIONS TO RESPOND TO CRISIS

A. Understanding Leadership as a Social Construct
For too long, the concepts of leadership and successful leadership have been
dominated by polarized thinking. As patriarchies became the mainstay for complex
economies, the notion that there was a proper place for an individual based on her gender,
ethnicity, and social class slowly settled into the basic framework of everyday life.118 To
be sure, these are historical relics, notions that have been passed on generation to
generation through societal and group norms. But as barriers to education and
opportunity were broken and equality became the standard promise, what was once a
“concrete wall” gave way to the concept of merit-based advancement.119
Today, most Americans want to believe that people are hired, fired, and promoted
in the workplace based on individual abilities and accomplishments.120 They believe that
people should not be disqualified from positions at any level merely because of
superficial characteristics or personal beliefs. Reflecting these convictions, barriers that
minority groups encounter no longer take the obvious form of exclusion at a particular
level. Instead, they have become embedded in our notions of identity, belongingness, and
success.121 These implicit associations122 limit society’s ability to move forward by acting

See ALICE EAGLEY & LINDA L. CARLI, THROUGH THE LABYRINTH: THE TRUTH ABOUT HOW WOMEN BECOME
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as mental block to what one can or cannot do. They define what pathways are
inappropriate or appropriate based on characteristics that are not as static as people are
led to believe. 123 By being more conscientious of an individual’s capacity to achieve
outside of socially constructed notions of ability, individuals can help produce a more
productive and effective society—people could reach their true potential.
It goes without saying that ethnicity does not affect the inherent ability of a
person. The idea that someone might even limit another based on his or her race or
nationality is abhorrent to most of us. Moreover, life-experiences help solidify the notion
that one is not incapable or lesser because of race. And yet this perception does not seem
to reach the realm of gender. The idea that biological sex and therefore gender plays an
enormous role in innate abilities and skills is not only embraced, but also justified with
science. Men and women are different because they have different brains, they say. And
it’s true; MRI scans of a male brain and female brain will show stark differences. 124 But
if difference is hardwired from birth, how in the world could a man and a woman share
the same ideas and abilities? Can persisting inequalities in gender really be blamed on the
brain?
The main problem with science-based theories on gender differences is that they
justify separation of roles for men and women. They suggest that people have an
appropriate place within society based on their inherited biological nature. This
perception reigns even for leadership roles: only 13% of all employed women occupy

unconscious to the individual in that they are not available for immediate self-report or
introspection).
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124 See EAGLEY, supra note 118, at 31; see also FINE, supra note 74, at XVI-VIII (highlighting various
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management positions, compared with 16% of employed men. 125 What is more, the
perception that women are more socially oriented and empathetic has relegated them as
mainstays in support areas of corporate businesses rather than in line for executive
positions.126 What must be fundamentally understood is that any overarching patterns of
differences based on social group we see today are in fact socially constructed and
perpetuated. After all, gender, just like ethnicity, is simply a grouping of select
characteristics that we associate with biological characteristics. Beyond that, it is difficult
to suggest that characteristics of gender are inherent. Therefore, the continued exclusion
of women in significant leadership roles today ought to be carefully scrutinized in an
effort to insure that such exclusion is objectively legitimate and not simply a result of
implicit associations or a reliance on older notions of what men and women are capable
of doing better (or worse) than their counterparts.
B. Origins of Gender and Gender Characteristics in Relation to Leadership
Qualities
In order to clarify the socially constructed nature of leadership as well as the
socially constructed nature of supposedly “masculine” characteristics, looking at
biological foundations may be helpful. By impressing upon the law the truth that biology
does not necessarily define the characteristics that a man or woman will show in his/her
behavior, the law will be forced to look more objectively at the qualifications that make a
person more or less suitable for a particular leadership position instead of focusing on
whether the claimant is barred from making a claim based on the way that they perform
their gender. This truth can be garnered by looking at studies of prenatal and infant
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development. Babies are not born with an understanding of gender or race; they are blank
slates ready to learn from their own experiences. At birth, there are only a handful of
characteristics that distinguishes a female baby and a male baby. 127 Notably, at birth,
boys are larger than girls, and their brains are 9% larger.128 Meanwhile, female infants
develop faster beginning from midgestation and ending with their earlier entry into
puberty.129 And that about sums up the essential differences between male and female
babies at birth. Any inherent differences that we see in personality are small differences
that are largely shaped by learning.130 So while girls and boys enter the world with slight
variations in social and emotional styles, it is the reaction of the person who encounters
these differences that ultimately trains the way these children respond—social tendencies
become selectively reinforced by the parents who raise their children. 131 In other words,
parents tend to treat male and female babies differently, not because they actually are so
different, but because of their own preconceived notions of what it means to be male or
female. 132 Furthermore, the rest of society will continue to engage with babies and
children in response to their sex thereby perpetuating the societal norms and behaviors
deemed appropriate to them, and thereby solidifying the child’s conceptions of gender
and appropriateness.133
So if femininity and masculinity are largely taught, and is not inherently
embedded into every person, then the psychological differences we experience every day
should be explained as the result of years of masculine or feminine ideology inflicted
LISE ELIOT, PINK BRAIN, BLUE BRAIN: HOW SMALL DIFFERENCES GROW INTO TROUBLESOME GAPS—AND WHAT
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 56 (2010).
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upon the brain until the differences becomes more or less permanently ingrained. 134 The
Bio-Social Origins theory of psychological sex differences as adopted by social
psychologists Wendy Wood and Alice Eagly suggests that psychological sex differences
stem mainly from the types of roles filled by men and women within societies.135 The
ability to perform various roles depended on inherited physical attributes—women raised
children because they were physically able to carry them to term and nurse them. This
gave men the initial freedom to fill the other social roles as the need arose.136 Moreover,
men’s greater size and strength gave them an advantage in fulfilling many of the roles
associated with production tasks before industrialization. These roles then gave them
control over resources and helped them to amass social power. 137Over time, as division
of labor became less rigid, men and women have been able to equally show their ability
to contribute in different areas of society, and the boundary between gender roles began
to fade. Nevertheless, the notion of appropriateness of social roles persisted in some areas
as though division of labor was still required. Thus, as “men and women continue to
divide important life tasks by sex, no one should be surprised by the continuing existence
of psychological sex differences.”138
Descriptions of “good” leaders show that the concept of leadership has been
infused with concepts of masculinity and manliness.139 For example, in identifying six
activities required of managers in business organizations, management scholar John
Miner, explains that managers must behave assertively, stand out from the group, be able
See Alvaro Pascuale-leone, et al, The Plastic Human Brain Cortex, 28 ANNU. REV. NEUROSCI. 377
(2005)(explaining brain plasticity as nature’s way of adapting to the environment rapidly and escape
restrictions of its own genome).
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to tell others what to do, and be willing to compete with their peers.140 On the other hand,
descriptions of managers have started to include some stereotypically feminine qualities
such as being helpful and understanding. 141 Nevertheless, even with the gradual
acknowledgement of the positive qualities typically associated with femininity into our
understanding of leadership, there is still a demonstrated masculine nature to managing
roles.142 This is not to suggest that models of leadership are completely rigid, but instead
that they vary with the context in which the leaders must act. In organizations built
around hierarchies, rank will influence how the members understand leaders. 143 For
example, the higher the level of rank or office, the more masculine qualities will
dominate, whereas in middle level positions, traditionally feminine traits such as human
relationship skills and other skills that foster cooperation and helping development of
subordinates are considered better. 144 A good way to consider the difference is by
comparing the role of an elementary school principle with that of a corporate CEO or
military officer.145 Nonetheless, ultimately, the most powerful and influential roles are
identified most closely with agentic and masculine notions.
Consequently, men gain a ”double advantage” in leadership contests with women.
Eagley explains the advantage thusly:
First, he is of course immediately categorized as male, which activates
masculine associations, which are similar to beliefs about leaders and thus
increase the odds that he is regarded as a leader. Once a man is viewed as a
leader, the qualities associated with leadership are further ascribed to him,
giving him an additional edge in the competition for leadership roles—no
such bolstering occurs for women. Even when women behave agentically,
EAGLEY, supra note 118, at 91 n.30.
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people may not recognize her behavior as competitive or assertive. Gender
stereotypes aid men on their path to leadership but complicate the labyrinth
that women negotiate on their way to positions of authority.146
In complete contrast, female leaders are disadvantaged from their status as both
woman and leader, and instead are subject to covert forms of prejudice and
discrimination. Unlike the double advantage that men have, women are confronted with
the “double bind.” Eagley defines the double bind as the conflict between the expectation
of communal behavior from a woman and the expectation of agentic behavior as a
leader.147 No matter what she does, a woman in a leadership capacity will more likely be
subject to criticism for either not being a good leader or not being a good woman. For
example, in studies conducted by psychologists Ziva Kunda, and Steven Spencer, they
found that helpfulness was met with approval when coming from men, but not when
coming from women.148 In the same vein, when men were unhelpful, they often got away
with it, whereas unhelpfulness in women was met with criticism or some other penalty.149
In a different organizational study conducted by Ziva Kunda and Paul Thagard, the
psychologists found that when employees reported helping their organizations beyond
levels required of them by their position, male employees received more promotions
while the promotions female employees received had no relation to their self-reported
helpfulness. 150 Studies have also consistently found that women who exert nonverbal
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dominance (such as staring directly at the other while speaking, or pointing at others) are
perceived more unfavorably than men who engage in such behavior.151 Similarly, verbal
intimidation has often worked to undermine women’s chances of advancing in her career
or even being hired.152
Unsurprisingly, the mere act of disagreeing can also serve to undermine a
woman’s appeal and influence while men who disagree often do not suffer from such
consequences.153 Multiple studies taken across nations have shown that communication
styles of men, whether warm or dominant, have little consequence on their likability or
influence.154 However, women are deemed more likable only when they are warm and
friendly, leaving assertive or more aggressive women to be penalized for their failure to
be likable or feminine, at least as evidenced by warmth and friendliness.155 Accordingly,
female leadership is often met with far more resistance from men as well as other women,
further limiting women who desire to be leaders from moving up the ranks as easily.156
Unlike their male counterparts, female leaders often must overcome hostility and
rejection from others in order to exert their influence and authority as well. 157 Eagley
cites two studies, one in which people were told about a woman succeeding in the maledominated occupation of electrical engineering.158 The study showed that those people
“assumed that the woman was less likable, less attractive, less happy, and less socially
viewing experiences with stereotypes, behaviors, and character traits as constraining one another
may be advantageous to understanding).
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desirable than a woman who succeeds in a typically feminine career.”159 In another study,
when told about a group of “successful female managers,” study participants labeled
them as more “deceitful, pushy, selfish, and abrasive than ‘successful male
managers.’”160
On the other side of the double bind, when women are “too nice” or
accommodating, people are more likely to raise questions as to their ability to lead thus
requiring women to “outperform men to be seen as equally competent.”161 The earlier
mentioned case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins presents a solid example of how one
woman could be denied competence despite the fact that she had accomplished more than
her male counterparts (in the form of securing a $25 million contract with the
government, something none of the partnership candidates had done).162 Similarly, Carly
Fiorina, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard recalls her experience with the double bind
thusly: “In the chat rooms around Silicon Valley, from the time I arrived and until long
after I left HP, I was routinely referred to as a ‘bimbo,’ or a ‘bitch’—too soft or too hard,
and presumptuous, besides.”163
The psychology surrounding leadership is undeniably complicated, but
nonetheless is obviously influenced by the fact that men have historically been the only
ones who could be leaders. While this is no longer the case today, the impact of male
dominance still pervades many fields of employment and the way the general population
understands successful leadership as well. The prejudice surrounding female leadership
EAGLEY, supra note 118, at 105; see also Mary Ann Cejka & Alice H. Eagley, Gender-Stereotypic
Images of Occupations Correspond to the Sex Segregation of Employment, 25 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
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therefore must be addressed by the law to the extent that the passage of time has not been
able to correct these notions and to the extent that they are imbedded so deeply into our
understandings of gender and behavioral propriety as well. Furthermore, unless the law
intercedes, the costs of this generalized understanding of leadership as a masculine
domain will continue to go unaddressed in discrimination claims raised by women who
have failed to receive promotions or secure job offers in male-dominant fields.
C. The Costs of Masculine Understandings of Leadership in Case Law
Case law surrounding discrimination in the context of promotions highlights the
disparity experienced by women in their male-dominant fields. In these cases,
discrimination takes a far more insidious form rather than an outright dismissal of a
woman for simply being female. Discrimination shows itself instead through more subtle
forms, such as an attitudinal penalty, or lower scores in evaluations, or simply through
the excuse that a woman is just “not the right fit” for the job or for the company—an
approach many employers take successfully.164
In Wilson v. B/E Aerospace a female employee brought a claim for
discrimination after she was not promoted despite her supervisor’s admittance that she
was “the obvious candidate” and “most qualified” for the job.165 Her supervisor explained
to her however that, “women aren’t typically in that type of position.”166 The Court there
ultimately ruled that Wilson had not made a prima facie case of discrimination. 167 More
substantially, in Jones v. Rivers, the plaintiff Jones was denied a promotion in favor of a
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male subordinate.168 Both the male subordinate and the promoting officer, David Rivers,
stated that Ms. Jones was “very helpful” “very patient” “cooperative” “intelligent”
“compassionate” and “dedicated” but nevertheless did not have “leadership qualities.”169
The court recounts, “stating his preference for aggressive individuals, Rivers described
Jonas as ‘timid’” though she excelled in every aspect of her job in terms of
performance.170 Similarly, in Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, a female plaintiff working in
finance was consecutively denied a promotion to a vice-president position despite her
consistently exceptional performance on the job and glowing evaluations and
recommendations from her direct Supervisor at SNY, an international banking
corporation.171 Promotions were decided by a general management committee consisting
of a few men acting as department heads, men who genuinely could not give a reason for
their failure to promote, except that it wasn’t discrimination. 172 For this reason,
Greenbaum was able to succeed on her discrimination claim in this case, as did Jones, in
her discrimination claim. However, it is significant to note that not all women can
maintain the level of exceptionality that both Jones and Greenbaum had presented, which
were ultimately the most essential elements in proving the prejudicial attitude the
employers had been able to keep under wraps prior to these women’s claims.173
Thus, these cases support the conclusion that in the context of leadership,
polarized thinking continues to dominate and act as an obstacle to women’s success in
leadership roles and their ascent to positions of greater influence. The cases also suggest
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that people only respond to explicit evidence of a woman’s substantial superiority over a
man before deciding that the woman truly is qualified or better than a man at certain
tasks. Interestingly, women who meet the high expectations placed on her as a leader are
often assumed by others to have an even higher degree of individual competence than
men who hold similar positions. As Eagly notes:
People think that only extreme individual competence could allow women to
surmount the challenges that they have overcome: – but only for their category,
and then gender and racial stereotypes are likely to prevail. To the extent that
people have an implicitly higher standard for women for success in masculine
domains, female candidates have to work doubly hard to get recognized. Women
generally have to have extraordinary track records in order to have career
success.174
V.

CONCLUSION

In today’s society, very rarely do people intend to discriminate based on gender or
biological sex. Far more common today is discrimination that results from a perceived
mismatch between a person’s gender and the role they are expected to play. To the extent
that discrimination law fails to realize the insidious nature of discrimination, it will fail to
rectify the discrimination where it is most dangerous—the leadership level. Granted that
gender categorization is an unavoidable part of the way humans process information
about one another, the law should intercede to the extent that gender and sex are defined
solely based on biology or “drastic stereotyping” and therefore do not take into account
the extensive identity work required of women. By incorporating the social
manifestations of biological sex and acknowledging the fact that gender performance
does not have to meet a rigid female=femininity and male=masculinity dichotomy, the
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law will not be able to penalize claimants of discrimination for their failure to conform to
historical notions of what it means to be a man or a woman.
More than ever, gender diversity within the top-management levels of the
business world is crucial. For one, women, more than men, have exhibited a style of
leadership that is more in line with the way the most successful contemporary businesses
are run.175 Studies have shown that democratic, participative, and collaborative styles of
leadership have been more successful and welcomed today than the old models of
hierarchy.176 Furthermore, today’s companies must learn how to best adapt to innovation
as technology advances at an ever-increasing speed. This requires that leaders increase
the availability of knowledge by creating collaborative workflows and multidisciplinary
teams. Leaders must also acknowledge the intensification of competition for talent that is
globally present by adapting motivational behaviors such as “inspiration” and
“expectations and rewards”.177 Of these behaviors that are particularly important today,
three of the four (inspiration, participative decision making, and expectations and
rewards), are observed more often in women than in men.178 A change in the law then,
may be the best and fastest way to bring about the change in leadership that we
desperately need as a society.
One way to change the law would be a legislative requirement that courts apply a
uniform definition of sex discrimination that is broad enough to acknowledge variations
in gender performance and excludes impermissible stereotyping of what characteristics
specifically belong to the male or female label. Another way to change the law would be
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a change in the evidentiary standard that would allow considerations of any serious
identity work that an employee had to engage in in order to navigate the work
environment and become accepted by his/her co-employees. In this way, claimants of
discrimination who had fought hard to blend in to the existing culture of her workplace
before bringing a discrimination claim would not lose their claim for having done so,
since courts would not be able to conclude that she “welcomed” any harassing behavior
or participated in the culture to her own detriment. Such changes in the law would allow
for a more unbiased approach to whether discrimination has occurred and take away from
the courts any opportunity to insert their own judgments on what is or is not proper
behavior befitting of a man or a woman. In light of the arguments for greater female
presence at the leadership level, such an intervention by the law could potentially result
in an improved American economy and better working conditions for every American.
And furthermore, while the world will continue to see women use their advanced
educations to get ahead in formal leadership positions, their absence in the elite and
highest level of leadership remain a threat to our society and reinforces the notion of
gender hierarchy. Some people may object to changes in discrimination law, whether
through a broadened definition of sex discrimination or by allowing identity work to be
relevant evidence, primarily for two reasons. The first would be the fear that such
changes would result in a flood of litigation from not only women, but the transgender
community as well. Similarly, there would be a concern for trial efficiency, since the
expansion of permissible evidence would probably result in longer trials. However,
relying on society to correct itself seems unrealistic in light of the stability of the
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unchanging demographics in positions of greatest power and influence.179 And in the
same vein, as much as transgender rights remain an issue that people are willing to fight
for, courts should not be afraid of taking on these claims and solidifying the importance
of equal rights for all, despite gender performance.
Good leaders are not special because they can simply bring in a profit or because
they have great ideas. Good leaders are good leaders because they motivate us, encourage
us, and set an example for what should be done.180 Old models of leadership focused on
managing and commanding have become obsolete, 181 and those that still subscribe to
these notions are arguably failing to develop alongside the rest of our fast paced
society.182 Leadership now is less about managing people and more about effectively
guiding people—people don’t want to be managed and the best workers don’t need
someone to oversee their daily activities.183 Leaders therefore must act as visionaries who
can maintain their vision and purpose as a beacon to others who subscribe to that vision
and purpose. For too long we have accepted the status quo of the idealization of
masculine portrayals of leadership and the male-oriented models in the workplace, and
the law in many cases have supported their continued existence. By addressing these
problems directly through a change in the law, our society might finally see the kind of
advances, both culturally and technologically, of which equal rights activists have only
dared to dream.
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